

The Diplomacy of *Wiedergutmachung*: Memory, the Cold War, and the Western European Victims of Nazism, 1956–1964

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In 1956 a number of Western European states demanded from the Federal Republic of Germany compensation for victims of National Socialist persecution. West Germany eventually concluded eleven bilateral compensation agreements between 1959 and 1964. The long, acrimonious negotiations were conducted with the Federal Republic's key allies at a time when their support was crucial for West Germany's international rehabilitation, the process of European integration, and the Cold War struggle. This article analyzes to what extent the day-to-day politics of the Cold War were intertwined with the politics of the past. It examines German negotiations with France and with Britain in more detail to illustrate that the eleven agreements were far from uniform.

In 1961 West German Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss publicly declared that his country's contribution to the defense of the West against communism constituted a form of *Wiedergutmachung*.¹ His eccentric interpretation captures both the elusiveness and the ambiguity of a term that still is widely used to describe indemnification for the victims of Nazi persecution. Critics have condemned the word as exculpatory and trivializing, as a term that implies that persecution and genocide could be "made good again."² Indeed, by talking about the "redemptive value of *Wiedergutmachung*,"³ some Germans seemed implicitly to assume that redemption had been purchased, that Germany had fulfilled its moral and financial obligations, and that therefore *Wiedergutmachung*, like the Nazi past itself, should be regarded as safely belonging to an earlier age. Yet, as Hans Günter Hockerts points out, in the early years of the Federal Republic the term was used by those few Germans who believed that Germany had a moral obligation to atone for Nazi crimes and to compensate the victims.⁴ These advocates of *Wiedergutmachung* hoped that the term would "appeal to people's conscience" more than neutral expressions such as indemnification (*Entschädigung*).⁵

The concept of *Wiedergutmachung* is clearly problematic in this context. For example, both the West German defense effort and volunteer work carried out at the Auschwitz memorial site were described as forms of "*Wiedergutmachung*."¹

in a strictly material sense, the term comprises two processes designed to meet the victims' financial claims against the perpetrators: restitution (*Rückerstattung*), and indemnification or compensation. Additionally it has a legal dimension: the rehabilitation of victims of Nazi criminal justice (*Rehabilitation*).⁷ Rehabilitation refers to the reversal of unlawful sentences imposed by Nazi criminal justice or other legal decisions such as expatriation. Restitution refers to the return of property that had been stolen or confiscated. This comprises mainly Jewish property that had been "Aryanized," property confiscated from a variety of nongovernmental organizations, and plunder (for example art and gold) that came into possession of the German Reich.⁸ Compensation refers to material compensation for the loss of life (in which case the dependants receive benefits), health, liberty, career and economic advancement. All these categories have, of course, both an internal German and an international dimension as the victims included people from numerous countries.

This article concentrates on the international dimension of compensation, scholarship about which has focused to date almost exclusively on the 1952 Luxembourg Agreement that West Germany concluded with Israel and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference).⁹ In the Luxembourg Agree-

legacies of the Second World War. To what extent was the issue of compensation intertwined with the politics of the Cold War and of European integration? How instrumental was compensation in the “politics of the past” in postwar Europe? What role did compensation play in public memory abroad and in (re)shaping perceptions of

or ideological/political belief—principles that had originally been established by the U.S. Military Government. Yet the law contained a residency qualification: eligible were those who lived in West Germany or West Berlin on 31 December 1952; or emigrants who during persecution had lived within the Reich boundaries of 1937 and who, by the end of 1952, had chosen to live in Israel or in the West. In addition, persecutees who were German and who had been expelled from the formerly occupied territories in the East, and Jews who had left these territories were also eligible. Special regulations applied for those considered stateless victims and refugees under the Geneva Convention. These mainly Eastern Europeans, unwilling to return to their communist-controlled home countries, were classified as “persons who suffered damage for reasons of nationality” (*Nationalgeschädigte*).¹⁶ Categorized as second-class victims (note the terminology: they were not recognized as persecutees), they were eligible for compensation but on a greatly reduced scale. For example, widows and orphans could not claim dependants’ benefits. The legislation reveals much about the understanding of recent history in the West Germany of the 1950s. Non-Jewish victims from occupied Poland and the Soviet Union were not recognized as having been persecuted for racial reasons. The law did not regard the war of extermination in the East as a specifically Nazi-perpetrated injustice.¹⁷

The BEG was essentially limited to German nationals and emigrants from Germany. With the exception of a handful of stateless refugees, the legislation did not apply to foreign victims. The Western allies had attempted to include German responsibility for foreign victims’ compensation in the Bonn Convention—a demand the Germans contested vehemently, arguing that compensation of individual foreign victims fell under the category of reparations, i.e., payments of war damages. The German argument was based on the Versailles Treaty, which included as reparations the compensation for loss of life, health, or freedom, and for deportation of individual citizens of the Allied states. This understanding was reconfirmed in the Potsdam Agreement and in the 1946 Paris Reparations Agreement.¹⁸ The latter stated that foreigners’ individual claims against the former German government were covered by German reparations payments. In other words, the Western European states had to pay their citizens compensation from reparations to be received from Germany.

The 1953 London Debt Agreement proved crucial to reaffirming the German position that compensation for foreign victims was part of the reparations complex. Focused on settling Germany’s prewar and immediate postwar debts, the London Agreement deferred all claims against Germany resulting from the Second World War. It stated that claims of foreign nations that had been at war with Germany, including claims of these states’ citizens, would be postponed until a final settlement of the reparations question.¹⁹ The clause effectively barred demands for West German compensation of foreign inmates of concentration camps and of forced laborers.²⁰ The reparations question would be settled only in conjunction with a German peace treaty.²¹ Given the division of Germany, a peace treaty, reparations, or compensation of foreign

victims were de facto postponed indefinitely. It was mainly the U.S. government that had insisted on the clause that deferred all foreign nations' claims against Germany until the final settlement of the reparations question. West Germany had just negotiated the Luxembourg Agreement with Israel and the Claims Conference, thereby fulfilling the element of compensation that was most important politically to the United States. The Federal Republic would also have to spend an estimated thirteen billion DM on rearmament in the following years.²² The West's new ally should not be overburdened with demands, the West German government frequently emphasized. However, the French and Dutch governments in particular objected to the London Agreement. Paris and The Hague expected their Jewish and politically persecuted citizens to be provided for by the West German compensation legislation. The 1953 Supplementary Compensation Law, which effectively excluded French claimants, triggered furious protests by French victims' organizations. The French requested further negotiations and changes of the legislation while American silence indicated tacit support for the German position.²³

The Western European Notes of 1956 and the Multilateral Negotiations with the Federal Republic

When the 1956 revised Federal Compensation Law did not bring any improvement for persecutees from Western Europe (*Westverfolgte*), the eight Western governments demanded in simultaneous diplomatic notes to Bonn compensation of those persecutees not covered by the existing legislation, and the establishment of a multilateral working group to solve the issue.²⁴ West German reactions were mixed.²⁵ Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano acknowledged that the situation was unsatisfactory and indicated a willingness to negotiate. In the Foreign Ministry plans were designed to set up a 100-million-DM charity fund. From the German government's perspective, the charitable nature of the fund was important to avoid recognition of any legal obligation to pay compensation. Von Brentano calculated 100 million DM for approximately 30,000 eligible claimants (about 3,500 DM each).²⁶ Jews who had been compensated by the agreement with the Claims Conference should be excluded, he recommended, and resistance fighters were to be barred from this fund as well.²⁷ Resistance fighters, the Germans insisted, had to be regarded as enemy combatants and therefore did not suffer from specific National Socialist persecution.²⁸ However, some officials in the Foreign Ministry suggested that for political reasons it would not be wise to categorize and exclude certain groups of victims; this would only trigger strong international protest.²⁹

In contrast, the Finance Ministry rejected all demands, arguing that the Federal Republic's financial situation did not allow for extra spending and that a West German

uncompromising stand to personal opposition to compensation (as expressed in embarrassing public outbursts) and even to seemingly antisemitic thinking.³¹ Schäffer continued his attacks against *Wiedergutmachung* even when he was no longer Finance Minister. Yet Schäffer's tight-fisted attitude was not confined to compensation; it was also at the core of the 1956 German rearmament crisis and of a fierce controversy over support costs for the British Army of the Rhine, a dispute that strained Anglo-German relations in 1956–57.³² The Finance Ministry was concerned mainly with the monetary reserves of the increasingly prosperous Federal Republic even if relations with West

gutmachung into a UN fund.⁴¹ Thus there is some validity to this argument, but for a number of reasons the impact of the Berlin Crisis on the negotiations should not be

ing continued prosecution of war criminals in West Germany; and in the writings of Fritz Fischer, Peter Weiss, and Rolf Hochhuth (to name a few). The past also resurfaced in the form of antisemitic graffiti on the Cologne synagogue in 1959 and other incidents, as well as the rise of the far-right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD).⁵³ The incidents, which raised concern about a revival of antisemitism in Germany, and the publicity of the Eichmann trial, which brought the horror of the German camps to an international audience of millions, clearly had an impact on the negotiations. Wiedergutmachung was a crucial aspect in the German strategy to counter negative repercussions of the Eichmann trial and to create a positive image of the Federal Republic abroad.⁵⁴

To a considerable extent it was public pressure, particularly from victims' organizations, that pushed the Western European governments to take up and to pursue the issue with the Germans, and public opinion abroad certainly contributed to German willingness to act. Publicity stunts such as British charity workers' plans to settle in India sick concentration camp survivors who had been denied compensation caused considerable concern in Bonn about West Germany's image.⁵⁵ The charity workers had started to negotiate with Indian officials about whether India would be ready to admit 200 stateless victims of persecution living in displaced persons' (DP) camps in Germany. The Foreign Ministry feared international embarrassment if a poor country such as India was widely reported to be caring for ailing survivors, while the prosperous Federal Republic paid them not a penny.

Compensation seems to have been linked more explicitly to other issues related to the Second World War than to the Cold War. The Netherlands and Luxembourg, for ex-

Blankenhorn wrote from Paris that the relationship between France and West Germany was crucial and should no longer be strained by the unresolved question of compensation.⁷¹ Yet while the Berlin Crisis was one important factor, the shadow of the past was another: the French Embassy informed their British colleagues “the French are firmly convinced that they had a lot of luck in getting this settlement. They were greatly helped, they feel, by the outbreak of antisemitism in the FRG some months ago, and negotiations were also in progress at the time of the Summit Conference.”⁷² Apparently the need to ensure French support at the Paris Summit and embarrassment over antisemitic graffiti in West Germany in 1959 greatly increased Bonn’s willingness to meet French financial demands. Thus, the final agreement turned out to far exceed French expectations: after the conclusion of the Dutch-German agreement, the French told their British colleagues that if they could receive twice the amount as the Dutch had (125 million DM) they would be “quite happy.”⁷³ The hope to enlist full French support against Soviet pressure on Berlin and concern over international reactions to reemerging antisemitism in Germany prompted German amenability on compensation beyond French ideas of the limits of Realpolitik. The sum paid to France was considerably higher than the amount of money granted to other European states. This can be attributed to the circumstances in the negotiations outlined above and, to some extent, to France’s crucial role in the process of European integration.⁷⁴

The negotiations with Britain started under different conditions. Apart from the Channel Islands, Britain had not been occupied by Nazi Germany. Although the British government and public opinion showed general interest in matters of compensation and criticized the shortcomings of the federal compensation laws of 1953 and 1956, the issue was not of major concern to the British government. When the Western European countries approached the Federal Republic in 1956, Britain recognized that it would not be at the forefront of claimants. The Foreign Office stated “we want our representatives to lie fairly low in these negotiations. We have very few national victims and it is therefore up to the countries that have the most such victims to make the running.”⁷⁵ British nationals entitled to compensation were few in comparison to France or the Netherlands. It was anticipated that these would be mainly stateless victims living in Britain, or formerly stateless individuals who recently had become British nationals, such as Eastern European (particularly Polish) emigrants. Besides the Eastern Europeans, Austrian emigrants to Britain (mainly Jews) formed the largest group. The British also wanted to support the case of stateless victims (largely Eastern Europeans) still living in DP camps. As mentioned above, these victims were categorized as Nationalgeschädigte (rather than as persecutees) by the 1956 compensation law. In short, British efforts were concerned mainly with the compensation of refugees.

The discrimination against stateless victims and in particular the rejection—often with outrageous arguments—of a majority of compensation applications from refugees in Germany received growing attention in Britain. The stateless victims proved to have a lobby in the form of Polish exiles, the British Roman Catholic Church,

British aid organizations, and charity workers, all of whom petitioned Parliament to support the case of the stateless, particularly those still living under miserable conditions in Germany. The Ryder-Cheshire Foundation, under the leadership of Sue Ryder and Group Captain Leonard Cheshire, undertook great efforts to bring the fate of these people to an increasingly sympathetic public. Ryder, a devout Catholic posted to the Polish section of the Special Operations Executive during the war, and Cheshire, a former fighter pilot and a war hero, had spent considerable time looking after sick DPs in camps in Germany. Ryder's campaign for "our forgotten allies" received much attention and, while her fiercely anti-German stance alienated many, other charity groups and influential parliamentarians found her cause worthy of support.⁷⁶

main problem for the British became the lack of reliable figures. Foreign Office estimates ranged from 14,000 to more than 63,000 formerly stateless individuals who had adopted British citizenship since 1945.⁸² The Foreign Office had to admit that they did

Socialist persecution excluded detention in a prisoner-of-war or internment camp.⁸⁹ The exclusion of surviving British war heroes and their dependants caused considerable outrage.⁹⁰ Attention focused on the survivors and dependants of the victims of the famous “Great Escape” from Stalag Luft III at Sagan, Germany. Most of the Allied officers who were recaptured after their escape were shot by the Germans. In British (and American) memory of the war, the “Great Escape” symbolized Allied ingenuity. The late inclusion of this category of victims in the distribution of compensation in Britain shows that public pressure was a decisive factor.⁹¹ Although Britain had not been occupied and initially its role in the negotiations was expected to be small, the amount of public interest turned the agreement into one of high political and symbolic significance. The agreement also showed that, while Nazi crimes and persecution played a significant role in British public memory of the Second World War, notions of persecution were far from focused on the Holocaust and the destruction of the European Jews.

Compensation, the Politics of Memory, and the Cold War

The Globalabkommen demonstrated that, although states were negotiating from different preconditions and with different priorities, the categorization of victims was a major

compensation can be regarded as part of the complex “politics of the past,” which to varying degrees was linked to the politics of the present.

Compensation raised difficult and painful questions not only for the Germans; it also implied questions of shared responsibility for crimes and suffering in other European states. While further research is necessary, the compensation debate seems to have helped stabilize or reinforce the myth of the “resistant nation” in France, as well as Austria’s self-image as the “first victim of Hitler’s aggression.” In the case of Austria, the very fact that compensation was paid clearly seemed to legitimize that claim.⁹⁵ In West Germany, as Hans Günter Hockerts shows, the Federal Compensation Law was one of the few issues discussed frankly and critically in the Bundestag at a time dominated by silence about the past.⁹⁶ A small circle of committed politicians, civil servants, and lawyers campaigned for the victims’ interests. Yet public opinion supported neither internal nor external compensation. When the Foreign Ministry discussed the *ex gratia* fund in 1958, it emphasized that this should be set up with a minimum of publicity.⁹⁷ News about the note of the eight Western powers triggered a number of letters to the Foreign Ministry from German citizens asking when German victims of Allied cruelties would be compensated.⁹⁸ Once the *Globalabkommen* had been negotiated, the West German government sought to wind up the process quickly and to secure from recipient governments agreement that no further demands would be made.⁹⁹ With the final amendments to the Federal Compensation Law in 1965 Bonn publicly declared the issue of compensation settled. This announcement went hand in hand with Chancellor Erhard’s claims that the end of the postwar era had come.¹⁰⁰

Yet the *Globalabkommen* continued a process of *Wiedergutmachung* to victims outside West Germany, a process that had begun with the Luxembourg Agreement. In the context of *détente* and *Ostpolitik*, ation n.sthéxn2dowe9d begun w97the Wfky anndly h43c-0.0alabko

Notes

1. Bundesarchiv, Militärarchiv, BW1, Rede von Verteidigungsminister Franz Josef Strauss, 16 January 1961.
2. For a discussion of the problematic terminology, see Hans Günter Hockerts, "Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland 1945–2000," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 49:2 (2001), pp. 167–69; Ute Frevert, Aleida Assmann, *Geschichtsvergessenheit—Geschichtsversessenheit* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: 1999), pp. 57–58; Nils Assmussen, *Der kurze Traum von der Gerechtigkeit: 'Wiedergutmachung' und NS Verfolgte in Hamburg nach 1945* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1987), pp. 9–12; Ludolf Herbst, "Einleitung," in *Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, eds. Ludolf Herbst and Constantin Goschler (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989), pp. 8–9.
3. Ernst Féaux de la Croix, high-ranking civil servant responsible for compensation matters in the Ministry of Finance, referred to the "morally redemptive significance [*moralische selbsterlösende Bedeutung*]" that the compensation agreement with Israel had for the German people. Quoted in Christian Pross, *Wiedergutmachung: Der Kleinkrieg gegen die Opfer* (Berlin: Philo, 2001), p. 296.
4. Hockerts, "Wiedergutmachung," p. 167.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
6. Jonathan Huener, "Antifascist Pilgrimage and Rehabilitation at Auschwitz: The Political Tourism of *Aktion Sühnezeichen* and *Sozialistische Jugend*," *German Studies Review* 24:3 (2001), p. 518.
7. Hans Günter Hockerts has pointed to the variety of possible meanings of the term beyond its narrow legalistic definition. Hockerts, "Wiedergutmachung," p. 169. In English the terminology has been even more confusing, and a variety of terms including restitution, compensation, reparations, recompense, indemnities, and indemnification have been used almost synonymously. Yeshayahu Jelinek has noted that Jews used all of these terms for material claims against Germany before *shilumim* (payments) became the most widely accepted Hebrew term. Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Israel und die Anfänge der Shilumim," in *Wiedergutmachung*, eds. Herbst and Goschler, p. 120.
8. On restitution, see "*Arisierung*" und *Restitution: Die Rückerstattung jüdischen Eigentums in Deutschland und Österreich nach 1945 und 1989*, eds. Constantin Goschler and Jürgen Lillteicher (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002); and Jürgen Lillteicher, *Politik, Rechtsstaat und Verfolgungserfahrung: Die Rückerstattung jüdischen Eigentums in Westdeutschland 1945–55* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Freiburg, forthcoming 2003–4).
9. For the Luxembourg Agreement, see (among others) Kai von Jena, "Versöhnung mit Israel? Die Deutsch-Israelischen Verhandlungen bis zum Wiedergutmachungsabkommen von 1952," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34:1 (1986), pp. 457–79; Rudolf Huhn, "Die Wiedergutmachungsverhandlungen in Wassenaar," in *Wiedergutmachung*, eds. Herbst and Goschler, pp. 139–60; Michael Wolffsohn, "Globalentschädigung für Israel und die Juden? Adenauer und die Opposition in der Bundesregierung," in *Wiedergutmachung*, eds. Herbst and Goschler, pp. 161–90; Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Die Krise der Shilumim/Wiedergutmachungsverhandlungen im Sommer 1952," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 38 (1990), pp. 113–39; Axel Frohn, ed., *Holocaust and Shilumim: The Policy of Wiedergutmachung in the Early 1950s* (Washington, DC: Ger-

man Historical Institute, 1991). More recently: Shlomo Shafir, *Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), pp. 159–78; Peter Münch, “Zwischen ‘Liquidation’ und Wiederaufbau: Die deutschen Juden, der Staat Israel und die internationalen jüdischen Organisationen in der Phase der Wiedergutmachungsverhandlungen,” *Historische Mitteilungen* 10 (1997), pp. 81–111; Ronald Zweig, *German Reparations and the Jewish World: A History of the Claims Conference* (Portland, OR: Frank B. Cass, 2001).

10. In addition to the eleven compensation agreements, compensation for Austria was settled as part of the Financial Settlement Treaty (*Finanz- und Ausgleichsvertrag*) between West Germany and Austria in 1961.

11. To date, no study focusing on the Globalabkommen between West Germany and the Western European states has been published in English. On the negotiations for a compensation agreement between West Germany and France, see Ulrich Lappenküper, “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Wiedergutmachung für französische Opfer nationalsozialistischen Unrechts,” *Francia* 28:3 (2001), pp. 77–101. On the negotiations between the Netherlands and West Germany, see Peter Helmberger, “Der Versuch einer Generalvereinbarung: Die Verhandlungen zwischen den Niederlanden und der Bundesrepublik um den Ausgleichsvertrag vom 8. April 1960,” *Zentrum für Niederlande Studien Jahrbuch* 4:2 (1993), pp. 71–98. On the history of the Globalabkommen, particularly the German position, see Tobias Winstel, *Die Verhandlungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland über Wiedergutmachungsabkommen mit westeuropäischen Staaten 1956 bis 1965* (M. A. thesis, University of Munich, 2000). Ulrich Herbert summarizes key aspects of the international dimension of compensation in “Nicht entschädigungsfähig? Die Wiedergutmachungsansprüche der Ausländer,” in *Wiedergutmachung*, eds. Herbst and Goshler, pp. 273–302.

The Ministry of Finance edited a multivolume “official history” of West German Wiedergutmachung compiled by a team of civil servants and lawyers. Volume 3 addresses the international dimension. Written by Ernst Féaux de la Croix (see n. 3), this rather one-sided account defends the Ministry’s position in the international negotiations. Féaux de la Croix provides brief accounts of all the bilateral negotiations based solely on (unidentified) West German sources and without the wider context of Cold War politics and the politics of the past. Bundesminister der Finanzen in Zusammenarbeit and Walter Schwarz, eds., *Die Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts durch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. 3, *Der Werdegang des Entschädigungsrechts unter national- und völkerrechtlichem und politologischem Aspekt*, Ernst Féaux de la Croix and Helmut Rumpf (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985).

12. Launched in December 2002, the project “Westverfolgte—Ostverfolgte: Die Auseinandersetzungen um die deutsche Wiedergutmachung für NS-Opfer in west- und osteuropäischen Ländern 1956–1972” is headed by Prof. Dr. Hans Günter Hockerts (University of Munich) and supported by the Volkswagen Foundation. An edited collection of individual case studies is forthcoming in 2005.

13. For details see Constantin Goshler, *Wiedergutmachung: Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus 1945–54* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992), pp. 131–48.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 248–57.

15. Hockerts, “Wiedergutmachung,” p. 182.

16. On Nationalgeschädigte see Laszlo Schirilla, *Wiedergutmachung für Nationalgeschädigte* (Munich: Kaiser, 1982).
17. Herbert, "Nicht entschädigungsfähig?," pp. 293–94.
18. See Burkhard Heß, "Völker- und zivilrechtliche Beurteilung der Entschädigung für Zwangsarbeit vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Entscheidungen deutscher Gerichte," in *Entschädigung für NS Zwangsarbeit: Rechtliche, historische und politische Aspekte*, ed. Klaus Barwig (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1998), pp. 80–81.
19. Christoph Buchheim, "Das Londoner Schuldenabkommen," in *Westdeutschland 1945–55: Unterwerfung Kontrolle, Integration*, ed. Ludolf Herbst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), pp. 219–29. The Federal Republic agreed to fix German debts at 14.5 billion DM.
20. Herbert, "Nicht entschädigungsfähig?," p. 280.
21. The Bonn Convention stated that the question of reparations would be solved in a peace treaty between Germany and its former enemies or, prior to a peace treaty, in bilateral agreements.
22. Hockerts, "Wiedergutmachung," p. 180.
23. Lappenküper, "Bundesrepublik," pp. 82–83.
24. A number of Western European governments had approached Bonn individually during the early 1950s to seek compensation for their victims of persecution. Bonn's dismissive attitude, culminating in the revised Compensation Law that did not improve the situation of the Western European victims, led to the joint note of 1956. Winstel, *Verhandlungen*, pp. 20–28.
25. Tobias Winstel (University of Munich) is currently preparing a detailed study on the West German perspective, focusing on the role of Chancellor Adenauer and the differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry in the negotiations for the *Globalabkommen*.
26. Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter AAA), B81, Bd. 182, Brentano an Schäffer, 8 November 1956. Money was to come not only from the West German government, but also from German industry.
27. The demand to exclude Jews was tacitly dropped. Von Brentano did not understand that the Claims Conference was mainly concerned with resettling Jews outside Israel. See Ronald Zweig, *German Reparations and the Jewish World: A History of the Claims Conference* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 69–83.
28. Ralf Vogl, *Stückwerk und Verdrängung. Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Straftatunrechts in Deutschland* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1997), p. 247.
29. AAA, B81, Bd. 183, Hausbesprechung AA, 11 November 1959.
30. AAA, B81, Bd. 182, Schäffer an von Brentano, 5 July 1956.
31. Speaking at a CSU party rally at Plattling (Bavaria) on 17 December 1957, Schäffer claimed

Böhm-Schäffer-Kontroverse 1957/58),” *German Studies Review* 12:1 (1989), pp. 124–28. Schäffer had also fiercely opposed the Luxembourg Agreement.

32. Schäffer blocked agreement with Britain to a point where Brentano telegraphed from London that the breakup of NATO was at stake. Hubert Zimmermann, *Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain 1950–71* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 34.

33. AAA, B81, Bd. 183, Verbalnote der Bundesregierung, 21 February 1957.

34. In fact the Czech government approached the French after the Western note had been sent. Public Record Office (PRO) FO 371/137543, British Embassy Bonn to FO, 24 March 1958.

35. Polish claims in particular were rejected with the argument that Poland gained German territory and possessions beyond the Oder-Neisse line. Even communists in West Germany were specifically excluded from compensation.

36. PRO, FO 371/130827, Memorandum by C. M. Anderson, 1 May 1957; also Féaux de la Croix, *Werdegang*, p. 206.

37. Helmberger, “Generalbereinigung,” p. 86.

38. *Ibid.*

39. See for example the West German note to Great Britain. PRO, FO 371/137545, Verbalnote (German original), 8 December 1958.

40. Lappenküper, “Bundesrepublik,” p. 91.

41. Hans Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952–67* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), p. 479.

42. Only the Danish Ambassador made an explicit link in talks with the Germans. AAA, B81, Bd. 183, Aufzeichnung Dr. Berger, 8 December 1958.

43. PRO, FO 371/137545, Pridham to Newing, 20 January 1959.

44. PRO, FO 371/130826, Memorandum by C. M. Anderson (FO), 13 March 1957.

45. AAA, B81, Bd. 182, Vermerk, 20 July 1956.

46. Hockerts, “Wiedergutmachung,” pp. 194–95.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

48. AAA, B81, Bd. 106, Herwarth an AA, 5 February 1959.

49. Winstel, *Verhandlungen*, p. 97.

50. *Ibid.*

51. AAA, B81 Bd.183, draft memorandum, August 1957.

52. The politics of history and memory in postwar Germany has recently attracted a large amount of scholarly interest. See for example Norbert Frei, ed., *Bekennen und Beschweigen: Die deutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001); Antonia Grunenberg, *Die Lust an der Schuld* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2001); Peter Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: Die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis heute*

68. Féaux de la Croix, *Werdegang*, p. 243
69. Lappenküper, "Bundesrepublik," pp. 95, 98.
70. Winstel, *Verhandlungen*, p. 75.
71. Lappenküper, "Bundesrepublik," p. 97.
72. PRO, FO 371/154235, British Embassy Bonn to Foreign Office, 28 June 1960.
73. PRO, FO 371/146012, British Embassy Paris to FO, 26 August 1959.
74. Lappenküper, "Bundesrepublik," p. 99.
75. PRO, FO 371/137543, Foreign Office Memorandum, 3 April 1958.
76. For example the "Refugee Defence Committee" and its vice chairman, Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith, PRO, FO 371/154232, Note by Mr J E Killick (FO), 25 February 1960.
77. PRO, FO 371/137543, McCarthy (FO) to Newing (British Embassy Bonn), 8 April 1958.
78. PRO, FO 371/154237, Newing (British Embassy Bonn) to Munro FO, 26 March 1960. The lonely British campaign for the stateless did not remain without internal criticism. The British Ambassador in Germany complained: "There is a limit to what we can do without appearing to be actuated purely by feelings of spurious moral rectitude, vented as always at German expense." PRO, FO 371/154235, Christopher Steel, to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 May 1960.
79. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B136/1148, von Herwarth an Auswärtiges Amt, 13 June 1958.
80. See for example the extensive coverage in the British tabloids: *Daily Express*, 1–7 January 1960; *Daily Herald*, 13 and 18 January 1960.
81. AAA, B31 Bd. 219, Auwärtiges Amt an Botschaft, London, 8 August 1961.
82. PRO, FO 371/160638, Memorandum by Margaret King, 22 November 1961, Memorandum by I. Vair-Turnbull, 29 November 1961.
83. AAA, B31 Bd. 255, Aufzeichnung von Herrn MD Meyer-Lindenberg, 4 October 1963.
84. PRO, T 312/772, Homer (FO) to Pliatzky (Treasury), 28 April 1964.
85. PRO, T 312/772, Note by J. A. Boyd-Carpenter, 12 May 1964. By the time Boyd-Carpenter went to Bonn, agreement had been reached.
86. PRO, T 312/772, Speaking note for conversation in Bonn, undated 1964.
87. AAA, B31, Bd. 275, Etdorf an AA, 23 April 1964.
88. On the Channel Islands under German occupation see for example: Madeleine Bunting, *A Model Occupation* (London: HarperCollins, 1995); Asa Briggs, *The Channel Islands: Occupation and Liberation 1940–45* (London: Batsford, 1995); Frank Keiller, *Prison without Bars: Living in Jersey under the German Occupation* (Bradford: Seaflower Books, 2000); and Charles Cruickshank, *The German Occupation of the Channel Islands* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). While Cruickshank speaks of a small minority of collaborators (Cruickshank, *German Occupation*, p. 152), Bunting draws a dire conclusion: "The Channel Islanders did not fight on the beaches, in the fields or in the streets. They did not commit suicide and they did not kill any Germans. Instead, they settled down, with few overt signs of resistance, to a hard, dull, but relatively

peaceful five years of occupation, in which more than half the population was working for the Germans.” While the Islanders were publicly exonerated after the war, Bunting points out “the