
¹ See Richard W. Boyd, "Election Calendars and Voter Turnout," *American Politics Quarterly* 14 (January April 1986), pp. 89-104; Richard W. Boyd, "The Effects of Primaries and Statewide Races on Voter Turnout," *Journal of Politics* 51 (August 1989), pp. 730-739; Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Trudi Happ, "Ballot Propositions and Information Costs: Direct Democracy and the Fatigued Voter," *The Western Political Quarterly* 45 (June 1992), pp. 559-568; Pippa Norris, *Count Every Voice: Democratic Participation Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Pippa Norris, "Do Institutions Matter? The Consequence of Electoral Reform for Political Participation," in *Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of American Election Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 133

Gore was selected, costing him the election. Spoiled ballots were more likely to occur with the more complex ballots. And, those disenfranchised by these complex ballots tended to poorer, less educated, minority, and elderly voters.²

The US has the longest and most complex ballots in the world. The average ballot in the US is 17.891.22Td003 mor0003>6 0Tj /TT0 1TA.d <05s 1TA.d <05s

Voting Paradoxes or perverse outcomes

There exists a number of voting paradoxes or perverse outcomes that can occur with IRV, which are not associated with the typical single vote system. Such outcomes contradict the claim of IRV proponents that IRV creates majority winners. Perverse outcomes include the possibility that one candidate could increase their vote only to lose the election. Another possibility is one in which every candidate can beat another candidate in a head to head matchup (such as candidate A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A...a paper scissors rock scenario) so that the election results fail to produce a true majority preference for *any* candidate. Yet another is one in which a candidate can beat any other candidate by a majority in a head to head matchup and yet lose the

Failing to Address the Real Problem

In essence what IRV is, is an attempt to use a technological fix to solve a political problem.

Single seat contests (such as mayor, or US Senator, or governor, or president) provide an

incentive for those of similar political mind (that is ideology) to coalesce behind a single

candidate in order to win a majority of votes and capture the seat—those that work together to

build a majority before elections win, those that don't lose. This structural incentive is the main

reason the US has a two party system. Forcing people of like mind to work together to win

elections then creates the governing majority. (The tip of the iceberg is the 2000 election where the

specific nature of those differences when it comes to IRV versus plurality voting systems is not known at this point in time. So, it is difficult to know how any race would play out under different rules or whether the strategic calculations of voters in an IRV system would be “purer” than their strategic calculus in the current plurality system. Finally, it is not known how often runoff elections would actually be necessary under the current system versus how often runoffs occur when using IRV. That is, IRV may actually end up encouraging the very problem it is designed to fix. While we don’t have the evidence to answer this question at this time, we can note how rare runoffs are under the current system—for example, there had not been a runoff election in Burlington for at least 25 years before it adopted IRV (I am unable to find data that go back any further), after it adopted IRV runoffs occurred in both of the first two elections.

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